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A Prelude to the Settlement of Wilder
Burt Neubornet and Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.tt
This dialogue never took place. Our purpose in attempting it
is not to reconstruct an historically accurate picture of an actual
negotiation but to raise questions about the role of consent decrees
in so-called "public interest" litigation. To do so, we have at-
tempted a wholly fictional conversation about settlement between
two lawyers engaged in litigating a complex constitutional case. Al-
though many of the points raised in the dialogue emerged out of
discussions surrounding a particular case-Wilder v. Bern-
stein'-the issues raised in the dialogue are broader than the mer-
its of the Wilder settlement. In the interest of raising issues and
reflecting an amalgam of many voices, we have each articulated
points that do not reflect our respective personal views and that
have little or nothing to do with Wilder. In the interest of a mini-
mally coherent organization, we have couched the dialogue so that
one participant poses pro-settlement arguments while his oppo-
nent argues against settlement. In fact, each of us holds more com-
plex views about the consent decree process than the dialogue al-
lows either of us to reflect.
A word should be said about the actual Wilder settlement.
While each of us participated in the negotiations, the document is
very much the work of the able and dedicated lawyers who had
principal responsibility for litigating the case-Marcia Lowry,
Michael Mushlin, Chris Hansen and Lauren Anderson, on the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") side; and Diane
Morgenroth, Michelle Ovesey and Gary Shaffer, representing the
t Professor of Law, New York University Law School; National Legal Director, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, 1982-86.
tt Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Corporation Counsel, City of New York, 1982-
87.
, The Wilder litigation was commenced in June, 1973. Wilder v. Sugarman, 73 Civ.
2644 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1973). The history of the litigation is recounted in Wilder v. Bern-
stein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1297-1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (approving settlement). The Wilder
litigation challenged the constitutionality of New York City's use of religiously affiliated
institutions as the principal components of its residential and foster-care programs for
troubled or abused children. Plaintiffs alleged that the system violated the Establishment
Clause and resulted in systematic racial and religious discrimination in access to quality
treatment facilities.
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City of New York.
Although this dialogue is not in any sense an historical ac-
count of the Wilder negotiations, we do expect and invite analysis
and appraisal of the Wilder settlement in light of the issues raised
in the dialogue. In that regard, we welcome the critique offered by
Professor Epstein and have each offered a brief rebuttal.
INTRODUCTION
The Wilder litigation was commenced by the Children's
Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union in an effort
to challenge New York City's reliance on religiously affiliated insti-
tutions as a principal component of its publicly funded program of
care for children in foster or residential placement.
Unlike the experience of many American cities, New York
City's child care network began as a series of religiously affiliated
child-care agencies that were privately funded to serve co-religion-
ists. Over the years, the private agencies accepted responsibility for
children of different faiths and accepted substantial public fund-
ing. At the commencement of Wilder, plaintiffs estimated that
more than 70 percent of the agencies' operating budgets were pub-
licly funded. The religiously affiliated agencies generally gave pref-
erence in admission to co-religionists, often in accordance with an
expression of a parental desire for in-religion placement. Plaintiffs
were troubled by four aspects of the New York system. First,
plaintiffs believed that the Establishment Clause forbade public
funding of religiously affiliated child-care agencies, especially when
preference in admission was given to co-religionists whose parents
requested in-religion placement. Second, plaintiffs believed that
the operation of New York's system funnelled black, Protestant
children to agencies of lower quality, while providing white Catho-
lic and Jewish children with a greater chance of finding a place in
the often higher quality agencies operated by Catholic Charities
and the Federation of Jewish Welfare Agencies. Third, plaintiffs
feared that children assigned to a sectarian agency would be una-
ble to exercise their religion freely if it differed from the sectarian
agency. For example, teenagers placed in Catholic agencies were
often unable to secure information on family planning. Finally,
plaintiffs believed that the natural distribution of religiously domi-
nated placement resulted in an unacceptable degree of racial
segregation.
Defenders of the New York system argued that the City had
an obligation to respect the wishes of parents for in-religion place-
ment if possible and that the system's placement decisions were
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dominated by legitimate therapeutic judgments. The agencies ar-
gued that the unique necessit of reconstructing a family environ-
ment for children in residential or foster placement made it not
merely desirable, but mandatory, for the City to utilize religiously
affiliated agencies when therapeutically appropriate. Defendants
firmly denied an intent to segregate and argued that, by the time
Wilder was close to trial, New York's system was overwhelmingly
nonwhite, with no discernible pattern of racial segregation.
Defendant: Our predecessors haven't had much luck talk-
ing about settlement. Let's try a new tack. Instead of starting with
the precise issues raised by Wilder, let's talk more generally about
the pros and cons of settling cases like Wilder. Maybe a more ab-
stract discussion will clarify the obstacles to settling Wilder.
Frankly, I'm of two minds on settlement, but it is an option that
should be closely explored.
Plaintiff: O.K. I, too, have my doubts about whether settle-
ment is either possible or desirable, but we might as well give it a
try. Just so we don't get bogged down in cross-arguments, let's as-
sume roles for the sake of a coherent discussion. You present the
argument for settlement; I'll argue against it. I know that will
cause each of us to overstate our personal positions, but it should
help in getting the issues onto the table quickly.
D: All right, as long as you recognize that in arguing for set-
tlement, I'm not conceding a flaw in my case or a weakness in my
negotiating position.
P: Fair enough. Open the bidding.
D: Isn't it time that we talked about settling Wilder? The
case is almost ten years old.2 It's already consumed enormous re-
sources-yours, the City's and the courts'.3 There's just no reason
to keep redoubling our efforts to the point where we lose sight of
our goals.
P: I suppose we should seek a settlement. Every handbook of
lawyers' behavior says so. I'd probably be drummed out of the Bar
Association if I refused to make a real effort to settle. You'd proba-
bly drop Rule 68 on me.4 Yet, aren't you troubled over the pros-
2 See note 1.
' Judge Ward noted that over 750 documents had been filed with the court during the
pretrial proceedings. 645 F. Supp. at 1297.
Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 68. See text at pp. 199-206 for a discussion of Rule 68 in the
context of the Wilder litigation.
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pect of settling public interest cases that raise fundamental consti-
tutional questions?5 Wouldn't we all be better off if the important
legal issues raised in those cases were judicially determined once
and for all, especially given the resources that are usually invested
in such a case?
You urge me not to lose sight of goals, but I'm just not sure
whether a public interest client's goals are advanced by a resolu-
tion of the case that leaves the basic constitutional issues open and
the challenged system in place, even if the system were to be sub-
stantially improved by a settlement.
D: You can't be- serious about never settling. The judicial
system would either collapse or consume unlimited resources if it
were asked to decide every case on the merits or even every public
interest case on the merits.' Settlement is the only economically
feasible method of resolving disputes on a large scale. Even if set-
tlement were less desirable than a full-dress decision on the mer-
its-and I certainly don't concede that it is-it would be a neces-
sary evil; like plea bargaining in the criminal context.
My point is not only that settlement is a necessary component
of any sizable dispute resolution system; in many cases I believe
that it is a preferred method of resolving the dispute, not merely
because it's more efficient, but also because it's more just.7
P: That's a strong statement. Let's take the two components
separately-efficiency and justice.
Efficiency first. If what you're saying is that settlement of pub-
lic interest cases is a price we pay for living in a complex society
that can't or won't expend enough resources to permit formal adju-
dication on the merits, I agree with you. Viewed that way, settle-
ment is a compromise with justice. It's the best that we can-or
wish-to do. I'll call that the "pure efficiency" argument for settle-
ment over adjudication: settlement is better because settlement is
cheaper. If settlement is really just a bargain-basement form of
justice that is better than nothing, but less desirable than the real
5 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984); Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (1986).
' See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 4 (1983).
7 See Robert A. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice:
Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wisc. L. Rev. 893. Compare Andrew W.
McThenia and Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 Yale L.J. 1660 (1985) with Owen
M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 Yale L.J. 1669 (1985); and compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice
and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 19 with Owen M. Fiss, Justice
Chicago Style, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 1.
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thing, shouldn't I insist on first-class justice for my client and hold
out for adjudication?
D: I don't for a moment equate a properly bargained settle-
ment of a complex constitutional case with bargain-basement jus-
tice. In fact, as I suggested a moment ago, settlement is often pref-
erable to adjudication as a matter of justice, not merely cost. But I
understand that you want to defer the justness of settlement for a
moment and discuss only the "pure efficiency" argument for
settlement.
Even if I were to accept your pejorative characterization of the
"pure efficiency" argument for settlement as bargain-basement jus-
tice, settlement is often a preferable option. Bargain-basement jus-
tice is better than Chapter 11 justice, which is where a blind pref-
erence for adjudication would take the system. Imagine a world
without settlement or, more realistically, a world in which settle-
ment is viewed in a grudging way as an undesirable way of termi-
nating a lawsuit. How many years would everyone have to wait in
such an "ideal" system to get the attention of a judge, much less to
convene a jury? What would be the quality of justice dispensed by
such a bloated system? How much money would it cost you to pro-
cess a single civil rights claim to judgment? How long would a civil
rights plaintiff have to wait for any response to a complaint?
Moreover, suppose you're right and settlement will result in
bargain-basement justice that gives your clients less than they
-and you-think justice requires. Who appointed you as the ulti-
mate arbiter of justice? You know as well as I do that in most
constitutional cases, plausible arguments exist on both sides. Each
side justly claims justice as an ally. What if a judge ultimately
agrees with my idea of justice and rejects yours? Would you accept
that as "first-class" justice? In an uncertain world, don't you do
your clients a disservice by gambling on whose conception of jus-
tice will finally be endorsed by the judge as "more just?" Why not
take the "sure thing" that a settlement offers? I tell you quite can-
didly, that's the only reason I consider settlement: because I'm
afraid that I might be worse off if I went to trial. I don't have to
think you're correct on the law in order to consider settlement;
merely that some judge may agree with you and leave my cli-
ent-and the City -worse off than under a negotiated settlement.
Shouldn't you be thinking the same way about your clients?
P: In most private law disputes, where what's at stake is eas-
ily quantifiable in money terms and the lawsuit turns on the appli-
cation of relatively settled norms to contested facts, I find your
arguments persuasive. If Wilder were such a case, we would have
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settled it years ago. But I'm not sure that the "pure efficiency"
argument in favor of settlement-or even the more powerful "un-
certainty" argument you just made-carries nearly as much weight
in constitutional cases that have a public dimension. Money isn't
what's really at stake in those cases. It's constitutional principle
and it's not for sale.
D: Even if I agreed that there is a fundamental difference
between old-style "private" litigation and new-fangled "public" lit-
igation-and I'm not all that certain there is-both the "effi-
ciency" and "uncertainty" principles argue strongly for the settle-
ment of even the so-called "public" action under certain
circumstances.' The public interest bar is certainly not blessed
with unlimited resources-quite the contrary. Wise management of
those scarce resources appears to me to call for the use of settle-
ment as a cut-rate method of advancing client interests. If nothing
else, settlement allows you to turn your case inventory over in an
acceptable time frame instead of becoming bogged down in inter-
minable and expensive litigation. In fact, if anyone has an incen-
tive to eschew settlement in public law cases, it is the more gener-
ously endowed government defendant. Over time, a no-settlement
policy would bleed the public interest bar dry.
P: Your point is a troubling one. Even if I thought it a good
idea to turn over my case inventory at periodic intervals, I could
not permit my judgment about settlement to be influenced by the
general economic health of the public interest bar-or by the con-
dition of ACLU resources. Surely, it would violate the canons to
allow such economic judgments to color the decision whether to
settle.
D: I'm not sure why that's necessarily so. Private lawyers al-
ways consider resources in deciding whether to settle. If you be-
lieve the market theorists, it's all they consider. Why shouldn't
public interest lawyers consider similar factors in thinking about
settlements? I'm not urging you to settle because it benefits you
economically. I merely want you to be aware of the beneficial eco-
nomic consequences of settlement in deciding whether it is an ap-
propriate-or even preferred-mechanism for terminating many
constitutional cases. Remember, by the way, I'm making this eco-
nomic argument in favor of settlement just to get the point on the
table. If this were real life, you'd be urging me to settle because it
8 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979), and Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976), for a description of the "public action."
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would be in your economic interest.
P: Frankly, I'm not enthusiastic about importing concerns
about resource scarcity from the private to the public arena as a
settlement consideration. It's bad enough that some private liti-
gants are driven to settle by resource constraints. Why compound
the evil by urging public interest lawyers to act the same way?
D: You misunderstand me. I'm not in favor of resource scar-
city. I wish everyone had enough of everything to do all they wish.
But they don't, and you know it. Resource limitations are facts of
life that just cannot be ignored by private or public lawyers. If you
refuse to consider the economic implications of an anti-settlement
policy out of a sense of ethical duty, all you're doing is shifting the
ultimate cost to unknown persons who cannot obtain your services
because you've used up your resources in existing cases. I'm not
even sure it's a good idea to think about public interest litigation
as a phenomenon unconstrained by market forces. Without the
discipline of resource constraints, I fear that the process of public
litigation would spiral out of control and become bogged down in
the personal egos of the participants.
I do understand, though, your uneasiness about compromising
a client's interest for economic reasons, so let's turn to the client's
interest. I wouldn't settle just for economic reasons, so I won't urge
you to-even for the sake of argument. Our clients' interest should
be the dominant issue in deciding whether to settle. Are you con-
vinced that your clients will be better off after a full-scale adjudi-
cation? If you are, don't settle. If I were sure that my clients-and
the City-would be better off if we went to trial, I would never
settle. So let's turn to the "uncertainty" point.
Are you confident that you'll prevail in Wilder? Even if you
prevail, do you have a clear picture of what the remedy will look
like? Doesn't the uncertainty principle function with even greater
force in constitutional cases-especially now, when we may be at a
major turning point in the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine?
P: The short answer is that I think I'll prevail; but it's obvi-
ously impossible to predict with certainty how the Establishment
Clause and race issues will be decided. But, if I have to guess, I'd
say there's a 70 to 80 percent chance we'll win.
D: What about remedy?
P: Once the constitutional issues have been litigated and de-
cided in our favor, a remedy will evolve naturally from the judge's
decision on the merits. I'm not certain precisely what it will look
like, but it will invalidate the present system.
D: If you're so certain you'll win, there's not much to negoti-
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ate about. Except, even if you were to win, it will take years and
cost a fortune and you really have no idea of what the ultimate
remedy will look like. Even if you win, your clients may well lose.
You may win a theoretical victory and leave the foster-care system
a smoking ruin. How will kids be better off by driving the best
agencies out of business? One reason I'm willing to consider a set-
tlement that I wouldn't ordinarily want is that I don't want to risk
a judge accepting your position-not just because I don't like to'
lose, but because I think the practical consequences for the City's
children would be terrible if you won. And if you were to lose,
you'll validate a system you think is awful and leave it wholly un-
changed. Moreover, even if you were to win on the law, a court is
constrained by a number of factors in imposing a remedy. Judges
are conscious of both federalism and separation of powers concerns
that limit their willingness to impose detailed remedial decrees.
Judges are-or should be-highly conscious of their ignorance of
the systems they're called upon to reconstruct. Any remedy im-
posed by a judge, who, at best, has an imperfect knowledge of the
system, risks being cumbersome and impractical. Isn't it much
more likely that a negotiated settlement will actually work in prac-
tice, precisely because it reflects the practical knowledge of the
parties? If that's so, why isn't settlement the best move for your
clients, even if you think you'll win on the merits? From my stand-
point, settlement is an option precisely because, given the risk of
litigation, my client is likely to be better off settling. Why aren't
you in the same boat?
P: Perhaps I am, but there are at least four reasons why I'm
very troubled about settlements in public interest cases in general,
to say nothing of my belief that this particular case can't be settled
because the positions are fundamentally irreconcilable.
D: Let's deal with the general objections first. Then we'll
turn to the specifics.
P: My first concern arises out of your observation a moment
ago that the power relationship existing between the plaintiff and
defendant in most public law cases generally favors the defendant.
Without dressing the process in fancy clothes, public interest liti-
gation is ,generally commenced on behalf of politically weak indi-
viduals or groups who seek to alter a status quo that has been im-
posed by more powerful participants. That status quo can be
expressed in legal or economic terms, but the bottom line of
much-I think most-public litigation is an attempt to alter the
legal or economic status quo in favor of persons or groups who
couldn't achieve the same results through the democratic or ad-
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ministrative process. The essence of public interest litigation is the
invocation of the judge as an "equalizer" who can articulate and
enforce so-called "rights" that improve a weak person's position.
Settlement, as a process, excludes the judge as equalizer and, thus,
eliminates the ability of the weak to confront the strong on rela-
tively equal terms. Won't settlements negotiated between grossly
disproportionate parties merely reinforce the status quo instead of
seeking to alter it? In fact, didn't you just tell me a minute ago
that I should consider resource scarcity as a factor in settlement?
When you talk about turning my inventory over, aren't you really
asking me to accept shallow amelioration of the status quo instead
of seeking fundamental alteration? Band-aids instead of surgery?
D: I don't really think so. Even if there is a great divergence
in power and resources between plaintiffs and defendants in public
law cases-I'm not sure that's always true, by the way; in the Ten-
nessee creationism case,9 for example, the ACLU clearly had more
resources than the State of Tennessee-the effects of the imbal-
ance in resources will only be exacerbated by insisting upon adju-
dication. Adjudication will consume far more resources than settle-
ment and the outcome will inevitably be skewed by the resource
imbalance. You and I both know that resource imbalance affects
outcome. Judges are terribly dependent on the quality of the sub-
missions-both legal and factual-made to them by the parties.
While many judges do try to even up the imbalance by appointing
counsel or masters, the judicial capacity to even the scales is quite
limited in our system. I'm not at all certain, therefore, that you
aren't better off with settlement-even from an exclusively re-
source-centered view. More fundamentally, though, I think you're
wrong in assuming that settlement excludes the judge as "equal-
izer." I assume that when you equate the judge with an equalizer,
you don't mean that literally. You mean the judge acting as an
oracle who articulates and enforces rights that the law guarantees
to the weak-rights that can be enforced by the judge against the
strong. It's not the judge who is the "equalizer," but the law that
he or she interprets and, of course, occasionally creates. By depict-
ing the judge rather than the law as the equalizer, I fear that you
exaggerate the judge's role. Adjudication can't take place without a
judge. Settlement often-but not always-does not involve the
judge. But both adjudication and settlement take place in the
"shadow of the law." 10 With or without a formal judicial presence,
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 579 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
10 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
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the settlement of a complex constitutional case takes into account
the state of the law and can be described as an attempt by the
lawyers to rearrange the status quo in accordance with a probabil-
istic assessment of what a judge is likely to rule the law requires.1
I'm interested in settlement only because my assessment of your
legal case is such that I recognize a possibility that you'll win. You,
on the other hand, recognize a possibility that you'll lose. Isn't a
settlement merely the reduction of those possibilities to concrete
terms? Resource constraints and extraneous factors like personal-
ity and short-term advantage enter into the equation, but isn't the
result of careful negotiation in constitutional cases a reflection of
the lawyers' predictions on ultimate success on the merits? If
that's true, the law acts as equalizer in the settlement process, but
it speaks, not through the mouth of the judge, but through a law-
yers' chorus, after consultation with their clients.
P: Your analysis depends on several critical assumptions
which simply may not be true in the real world. It assumes that
resource imbalance won't stampede plaintiffs into settlements that
undervalue the legal strength of their claim. It assumes that the
settlement process is designed to-and actually does-result in an
equilibrium keyed to the strength of a plaintiff's claim. It assumes
that parties really create a "bargain in the shadow of the law" by
reducing probabilistic assumptions to concrete compromises. Most
importantly, it assumes a relative uniformity of knowledge and
outlook by the participants that will allow them to reach consen-
sus. It overlooks, I'm afraid, a fundamental aspect of much public
litigation-the degree of passion with which particular views are
held. The pure probabilistic model must be supplemented with an
intensity or, if you will, an irrationality factor that may well throw
your calibrations out of joint.
I concede, though, that if a general imbalance of resources ex-
ists between plaintiffs and defendants in public interest cases,
plaintiffs will be worse off over time by forcing everything into ad-
judication. So I guess you've dealt with my first objection.
D: I should quit while I'm ahead, but there's yet another an-
swer to your resource-imbalance point. I think that you substan-
tially overstate the imbalance, especially at the settlement stage. A
careful, modestly funded public interest lawyer can bring real pres-
sure on an intimidating government entity in at least three ways. A
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950'(1979).
11 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settle-
ment and Rulemaking, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 637 (1976).
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public interest lawsuit can tie up very substantial government re-
sources that are needed to deal with other pressing issues. Merely
because an absolute difference in resources exists doesn't mean
that a government defendant is relatively better-off than a public
interest lawyer who has the luxury of focusing on only one issue.
Moreover, the pendency of a lawsuit can adversely affect the func-
tioning of critical governmental systems. For example, litigation
challenging a civil service test can freeze promotions and put tre-
mendous pressure on systems that need the infusion of new blood.
In such a setting, resource allocation really favors the plaintiffs.
Finally, no official relishes the personal opprobrium of being found
guilty of constitutional violations. Settlement will often be prefera-
ble to risking an embarrassing judicial condemnation.
P: You may be right that I've overstated the resource imbal-
ance point, but for every official who settles to avoid the risk of
judicial opprobrium there's another one who won't settle because it
looks like a concession of wrongdoing.
D: Even if I agree with you on that point, your general re-
source imbalance argument isn't terribly strong. If the imbalance
exists, it's only exacerbated by insisting on even more expensive
adjudication; and it may well not exist in many cases. Let's hope
your second objection isn't stronger.
P: O.K., here's the second objection. Even if I were per-
suaded that a strong preference for settlement would not, as a gen-
eral rule, cause the outcome of litigation to mirror the general re-
source imbalance in society between the strong and the weak, I'm
not certain how the lawyers in a public interest case should go
about deciding what to give up in order to achieve a settlement. In
an ordinary private case, both lawyers can depend on the clients to
make sophisticated cost/benefit decisions necessary to settlement.
In a public law case where the named plaintiffs are often highly
unsophisticated and the bulk of the class often hasn't even come
into being yet, how can a lawyer make the value judgments critical
to settlement? Even if I had the hubris to try, how would I go
about securing consent-both in the moral and legal sense? Isn't
there an insuperable problem in placing critical value judgments,
affecting both parties and non-parties alike, in the hands of self-
appointed arbiters who have absolutely no accountability to the
constituency they serve or to the public at large? Don't you have a
similar dilemma as a government lawyer, since a settlement will
often affect the lives of persons who, as a practical matter, have
little ability to influence your judgment?
At least when a public law case proceeds to adjudication, an
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official clothed with public authority makes the decisions. You may
not like what a judge does, but at least the judge is a government
official, constrained to act openly and in accordance with carefully
articulated procedural safeguards. Settlement, on the other hand,
unfolds in darkness, with poorly developed procedural protections.
Aren't you concerned about a process of resolving highly signifi-
cant constitutional disputes that routes a virtually unreviewable
power to affect the lives of plaintiffs, defendants and the general
public from a formally constrained judge to lawyers with almost no
public mandate and no formal accountability? Even if some law-
yers think themselves qualified to make the value judgments nec-
essary for settlement, are we anxious to clothe lawyers generally
with such a mandate for private lawmaking about public issues?
D: I never knew you to be so troubled about nondemocratic
decision making. Couldn't a similar objection be lodged against ad-
judication itself? After all, adjudication permits a single, non-
elected official to impose enormous burdens on individuals, most of
whom are non-parties and never get any chance to affect the judg-
ment. I do concede, though, that an important distinction does ex-
ist between public pronouncements by a judge and private law-
making through settlement. A preference for settlement does risk
vesting a disturbing amount of lawmaking power in lawyers, with-
out providing much in the way of formal check or public accounta-
bility. You overlook, though, the fact that lawyers can't escape the
decision whether to settle. If a lawyer, after analyzing the issues
carefully, comes to the conclusion that his or her client risks worse
treatment after adjudication than is likely through settlement, of
course the lawyer should settle. The fact that third parties may be
adversely affected by the settlement on either side shouldn't pre-
vent a lawyer from making a deal that heads off the risk of some-
thing even worse. Unless you want to forbid settlement entirely
whenever it affects third parties, such considerations should be
handled by careful procedures that invite affected persons to par-
ticipate in the settlement's formulation and to attack its fairness.
Also, as you pointed out a moment ago, the social changes
wrought by settlement will, generally, be less drastic than changes
brought about by successful adjudication. Given that fact, perhaps
we should be willing to tolerate a lower level of official participa-
tion in the process. Where truly radical alterations are possible-as
in adjudication-the participation of a judge as a formally sanc-
tioned public actor is critical. Where less drastic alterations are
likely-as in settlement-the need for a formally sanctioned pro-
cess seems less dramatic.
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More fundamentally, though, your concerns about legitimating
the necessary consent and policing the settlement process as it af-
fects third parties can be blunted, if not eliminated, by careful pro-
cedural constraints. Rule 23 currently requires a judge to hold a
hearing before approving the settlement of a class action. 12 That
hearing, if carefully conducted, should prove the vehicle for gaug-
ing the necessary consent and evaluating any objections by class
members or affected third parties to the proposed settlement. I
recognize that settlement approval hearings are often disturbingly
pro forma, but the appropriate response is not to scrap settlement,
but to upgrade the quality of judicial participation in assessing the
existence of consent and the settlement's fundamental fairness. In
fact, I believe a judge should encourage parties who are in the pro-
cess of negotiating a settlement that affects third parties to include
them in the negotiation process.
P: Aren't you putting an awful lot of weight on the ability of
a judge to elicit consent and assess fairness? After all, by defini-
tion, a judge ought not to expend substantial resources on the set-
tlement. If a judge spends as much time on the settlement as he or
she would have on the adjudication, isn't the pure efficiency argu-
ment demolished? Can a judge scrimp on the commitment of re-
sources to a complex dispute and still purport to assess the exis-
tence of consent and the fairness of the settlement? That's
especially so if the settlement is supposed to represent a rough ap-
proximation of the probabilities of the outcome on the merits. If a
judge does a serious job of assessing the probability of success and
a serious job of examining the consent and fairness issues, why not
adjudicate the case? It's precisely the designedly thin nature of ju-
dicial participation in the settlement process that exacerbates the
danger of unfairness and shifts enormous de facto power to law-
yers. On the other hand, I question whether it is wise to invest the
necessary judicial energy to assure a real check on the lawyers in-
stead of using that energy to adjudicate.
D: I don't underestimate the difficulty of the judge's task in
evaluating the fairness of a settlement. I don't think it's any
harder than adjudication, though, and it will probably consume
fewer resources. Moreover, settlement seems to me to enjoy two
significant process-based advantages. While adjudication is bound
by formal evidentiary constraints, the participants in a settlement
negotiation will often engage in an informal exchange of informa-
12 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(c).
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tion and a flexible dialogue with experts that provides a richer and
more complete factual base than would be available to an adjudi-
cating court. Perhaps even more importantly, settlement doesn't
require a dichotomous resolution of a dispute that may have a
good deal of merit on both sides. It permits the parties to avoid an
either/or resolution to a dispute that may not be amenable to such
an approach.
P: That may be so, but it's precisely the limited judicial role
in settlement that leads to my third objection. To be worthwhile
from a plaintiff's standpoint, a settlement in a complex constitu-
tional case must make a real dent in the status quo in favor of the
politically weak group on whose behalf the case was brought. That
means that someone who benefits from the status quo will often be
unhappy with the terms of the settlement. I argued a moment ago
that settlements had the real prospect of unfairly overlooking the
interests of affected third parties. The flip side of that fear is that
the affected third parties will resist implementation of the settle-
ment. Altering institutional behavior patterns is like trying to turn
the Queen Elizabeth II around with a paddle.
In order to have any hope of success, a settlement agreement
that alters the status quo must be able to overcome the inertial
drag of disgruntled critics, who generally have far more political
clout than the settlement's beneficiaries. In my experience, the
only hope of overcoming this inertia is a firm commitment from
the court to exercise sustained and aggressive remedial oversight.
Even in an adjudicatory setting, it is often impossible to persuade
a judge to use all the remedial tools at his or her disposal to effec-
tuate a judgment on the merits. But adjudication does give rise to
two very powerful remedial arguments. Once an adjudication has
taken place, the logic of the decision on the merits often dictates a
remedy. That's what I meant when I said that if we win Wilder, a
remedy will logically evolve from the nature of the decision. More
importantly, though, once adjudication occurs, the integrity of the
judicial process is put into play.
Recalcitrance by disgruntled critics of an adjudication threat-
ens not only the particular gains made by the plaintiff group, but
calls into question the very integrity of the rule of law. That's why
Cooper v. Aaron13 is such a milestone. In a settlement context,
though, neither engine is present to drive the remedial machinery.
By definition, there will not have been a decision on the merits-so
3 358 U.s. 1 (1958).
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the remedy can't be logically linked to an unassailable claim of
right. Moreover, the integrity of the settlement does not implicate
the rule of law; it merely raises questions about privately negoti-
ated arrangements. In fact, resistance to a settlement often has a
stronger moral claim on the rule of law than adherence. After all,
resistance is generally premised on the argument that innocent
persons are being injured by a settlement that gives plaintiffs more
than the law entitles them to. Without the motive force of an adju-
dication, I have very little confidence in the capacity of the legal
system to enforce settlements that cause real dislocations in the
status quo. If I'm right, a settlement is, at best, an illusory victory
and, at worst, an act of positive deception.
D: If I thought you were right, I would actively discourage
settlements in constitutional cases because it would be dishonest to
make them. As an empirical matter, though, I think you're wrong;
although I agree that no hard data exist that assess the degree to
which public law settlements are, in fact, implemented. It's about
time that someone carried out a serious empirical study of the effi-
cacy of settlement in constitutional cases. But even in the absence
of hard data, there are at least two powerful responses to your
concerns.
First, you admit that even remedial orders following adjudica-
tion are, more often than you like, inadequately enforced. More-
over, even when a judge goes all out to enforce an adjudication,
you recognize that transforming the decree into a genuine change
in the status quo is often difficult. Have you considered why it is
often so difficult to translate adjudicatory decrees into real world
change? Isn't one important reason the difficulty of imposing sig-
nificant change from the outside on an entrenched status quo that
can frustrate change without formally disobeying the order? When
you move from an externally imposed solution following formal ad-
judication to a consent-generated resolution following a genuinely
participatory negotiation, isn't there a greater likelihood of volun-
tary-or at least grudging-compliance? And, doesn't that in-
creased capacity for acceptance by genuine consent at least miti-
gate your concern over enforceability?
Second, I think that you significantly undervalue the judicial
commitment to enforcing settlements in constitutional cases; espe-
cially when those settlements have been negotiated and approved
pursuant to a participatory negotiation process that gives them a
special claim on moral legitimacy. Given the efficiency arguments
in favor of settlement, judges have a powerful incentive to make
settlement an attractive option. That, in itself, translates into a
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strong inducement to enforce them. In addition, once a judge
places the imprimatur of the court on a consent decree, the integ-
rity of the judiciary is at least partially implicated. The greater the
judge's involvement in the process of assuring that a settlement
enjoys the requisite assent of the affected community and is funda-
mentally fair, the greater the judge's commitment to enforcing it.
When you combine the natural inducement to conserve scarce ju-
dicial resources with the special inducement to enforce settlements
on which a judge has lavished attention, and prestige, enforceabil-
ity does not pose that much of a problem. What problem it does
pose seems outweighed by the greater likelihood of acceptance of a
consensual arrangement.
P: Unfortunately, I fear that both the law and the facts
weaken your argument. Courts have shown a disturbing tendency
to permit defendants to avoid consent orders in two ways: by
granting motions for modification based on changed circumstances;
and by allowing defendants' claims of impossibility to justify fail-
ures to carry out settlement agreements. You can count on one
hand the number of times a court has really used the contempt
power to enforce a settlement. It just doesn't happen. I do agree,
though, that increasing the judge's role in policing consent and
fairness is likely to increase a court's willingness to use its power to
enforce the settlement. But the more energy the judge-and the
parties-must expend on the settlement process to assure its fair-
ness and credibility, the less persuasive the pure efficiency argu-
ment becomes.
D: I think you're seriously misstating the issue of whether
settlements should be flexible documents that can be modified to
account for changed circumstances or just plain miscalculation. Af-
ter all, even a judgment can be modified under appropriate circum-
stances. Why not a settlement? And even a judgment recognizes
impossibility of performance as a legitimate issue. In fact, if you
were to succeed in turning settlements into rigid straight jackets
that threatened to develop into dysfunctional burdens, you would
make it almost impossible for a responsible government official to
enter into a settlement. I agree that a settlement shouldn't lightly
be subject to modification; but it should be possible to mesh plain-
tiffs' concerns for certainty with both sides' legitimate interests in
flexibility and adaptability. The answer can't be to give up on set-
tlement because it's too rigid or too flexible, but to incorporate
mutually acceptable mechanisms for modification or amendment
into the consent decree itself.
P: Even if you're right about the enforceability of settle-
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ments, I'm still troubled by a fourth fundamental objection to a
strong preference for settling public law cases. It's an objection
that flows from an ambivalence about the role of courts. Are they
predominantly-or even exclusively-mechanisms for resolving
disputes or are they engines for the articulation of appropriate
norms of behavior? A strong preference for settlement seems to me
to resolve this ambivalence in favor of dispute resolution without
giving enough weight to norm articulation.
Especially in public law cases, I believe that the principal role
of courts is the elaboration and enforcement of principles of public
law. When we strongly encourage the settlement of public law dis-
putes, don't we inhibit the judicial articulation of norms of behav-
ior that protect the weak against the strong? As you mentioned
earlier, strongly articulated principles of public law are the critical
matrix within whose shadow settlement negotiations take place.
More importantly, if the role of law is to induce general compli-
ance with appropriately defined norms of behavior, a strong prefer-
ence for settlement fails to advance that significant end. Rather, it
establishes localized, hand-tailored rules that may well resolve a
particular grievance and benefit affected parties, but do little or
nothing about articulating general norms to which people may con-
form. In the public law area, such a subtle shift away from norm
articulation limits the extent to which public interest litigation can
aid the weak. If we cannot encourage the strong to comply volunta-
rily with self-restraining norms without resorting to litigation, the
practice of public law will do little to ameliorate the plight of the
weak. Settlement, as a process, doesn't generate those norms. Even
if every settlement were just, were consented to by the affected
parties, and were genuinely enforced, I'd still be concerned about a
strong preference for settlement because of the inherently narrow
impact that private lawmaking can have on the weak. Wouldn't
lawyers like me be giving up the chance to effect widespread social
change in return for a narrow set of non-replicable improvements?
D: I don't think so. First, a strong preference for settlement
will not eliminate adjudication as a significant aspect of public liti-
gation. We certainly do not appear to be in danger of cutting off
the flow of judicially articulated rules of law. Some might say that
we suffer from too much judge-made law. We certainly are not
starved for judicial pronouncements. Thus, while your point is
well-taken as a caution against forcing too many public law cases
into settlement, I don't see it as a practical objection to a strong
preference for settlement in a system which produces such a large
quantity of formal adjudications.
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P: That's only partially true. I don't want to interrupt your
response, but fee-shifting proposals like the extreme version of
Rule 68 and the tactics made possible by the Jeff D. case, 4 may
well radically diminish the likelihood of adjudication to the point
where my concern is more than theoretical.
D: Let's put off talking about Rule 68 and Jeff D. for a mo-
ment. I agree that we should consider whether it's a good idea to
apply pressure to force settlement in public law cases, but let's
stick to your general objections to settlement for the time being.
Your concern that a strong preference for settlement sacrifices gen-
eral norm articulation for specific dispute resolution overlooks the
potentially broad impact of a creative settlement. Much significant
public law litigation is prosecuted as a class action, directly affect-
ing the lives of thousands of class members. Whatever the validity
of your concern in the context of the old two-party case, it doesn't
seem nearly as acute in an era of massive class actions.
You also underestimate the general effect of a class settle-
ment. While a settlement does not act as stare decisis, it does es-
tablish a benchmark against which similar disputes are measured.
The evolution of a benchmark settlement exerts a broad influence
on the resolution of similar disputes in much the same way that a
persuasive opinion in one jurisdiction influences subsequent behav-
ior in another. In fact, a nationwide Settlement Reporter wouldn't
be a bad idea, especially in the public law area. Even at the level of
norm articulation, therefore, I think your objection is overstated.
More fundamentally, though, I think you've allowed yourself
to be trapped in a set of linguistic extremes. You're right, of
course, in noting that courts resolve disputes and articulate general
norms. You're also right in noting that settlement is more signifi-
cant as a dispute resolution mechanism than as a norm articulation
device. I think you're wrong, though, in assuming that those are
the only functions a court can perform.
You recall that I argued a few moments ago that settlement
might even be preferable to adjudication in certain settings. I said
that because I believe courts can play a third role in public law
cases. Most public law cases pit plausible claims against each
other. Adjudication forces a dichotomous resolution of a dispute
that may not be suited for an either/or resolution. Ordinarily, is-
sues that aren't suited for dichotomous resolution through adjudi-
cation are routed through the democratic process. When that pro-
'" Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986).
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cess functions optimally, it provides a mechanism to evaluate and
integrate the needs of conflicting interest groups. When, however,
one of the interest groups is chronically weak, the democratic
model often operates merely to reinforce the existing power imbal-
ances. You tell me that much of the theory of public litigation is
premised on the attempt to use adjudication as a way to shore up
the positions of chronically underpowered interest groups. But ad-
judication as a dichotomous process often forces a court into an
either/or posture in which the interests of one group trump the
countervailing legitimate interests of another. Moreover, adjudica-
tion often risks an enormous dislocation that threatens innocent
bystanders. Who'll be hurt if there is chaos in the foster-care sys-
tem? Settlement provides an opportunity to create an artificial
market mechanism for the orderly integration of conflicting inter-
ests that doesn't sacrifice one set of interests to another, but per-
mits a hybrid solution reflecting an amalgam of the interests.
The settlement process permits a form of bargaining between
politically weak interest groups, enjoying enhanced power because
of perceived legal assets, and conflicting stronger groups. In an or-
dinary political setting, the strong groups would submerge the
weak. In the insulated atmosphere of a settlement negotiation, the
weaker groups are able to command greater attention and consid-
eration because they possess a claim to external imposition of their
position by a judge. Properly conceived, the settlement process is
not unlike the give and take that characterizes democratic decision
making, except that the relative weights of the contending groups
have been rearranged by the introduction of legal assets. The net
result of such a process should be the emergence of a brokered so-
lution that takes into account the interests of the affected parties
and that is roughly similar to idealized democratic decision mak-
ing. In fact, you can characterize a properly orchestrated settle-
ment as a form of private legislation that emerges from the resolu-
tion of a set of interests that have been externally strengthened
and weakened by the prospect of ultimate intervention by a judge.
P: You're not describing a simple process of bilateral negoti-
ation. If you're serious about pursuing the democratic analogy, it's
necessary to assure representation for a host of affected interest
groups. In a case like Wilder, you'd need a room the size of the
United Nations just to accommodate the participants. Aren't you
describing an enormously complex process that will almost cer-
tainly consume as much resources as adjudication?
D: Perhaps I am. I have no illusions about the amount of
effort and resources that a fair and acceptable Wilder settlement
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will require. But the interests at stake in a case like Wilder are too
varied, the risks to the children too high and the values too evenly
balanced for the case to lend itself to dichotomous resolution. It
shouldn't be necessary to brand one side as "right" and the other
as "wrong" to resolve the Wilder dispute. Nor should it be neces-
sary to put the entire system of foster care at risk. Rather, in a
case like this, where plaintiffs have a strong legal case, what's
needed is a mechanism which both permits the interests of the po-
litically weak plaintiff groups to contend fairly with the interests of
the politically powerful defendant groups, and adequately accounts
for the interests of other affected groups. Without a strong legal
position advanced on behalf of the plaintiff, I wouldn't bargain at
all, even if I thought the status quo were unfair; but given the
strength of the legal assets that you've assembled on behalf of the
plaintiffs, it seems to me that you're in an excellent position to
renegotiate the status quo from a position that fairly approximates
the needs of your clients. Your legal assets aren't substantial
enough to make everyone else surrender; neither are mine; but
both are too substantial to be ignored. If your political position
were as strong as your legal position, you wouldn't need a lawsuit
to redress the balance.
P: You're describing a much more ambitious process than a
mere bilateral negotiation. If I understand you correctly, in order
to assure a fair settlement to all affected persons, you want to cre-
ate a participatory forum, not unlike a legislature, where the par-
ties, after hearing from all affected persons, will seek to agree on a
private statute that structures their future relationship; and where
the interests of weak political groups are artificially enhanced by
the prospect of outside interference on their behalf in the form of a
threatened adjudication by a judge. The strength of the enhance-
ment enjoyed by the weak group would be directly proportionate
to the perceived likelihood of judicial intervention.
D: That's right, as far as it goes. But I'm also suggesting
something more. The initiation of public litigation on behalf of a
so-called victim group is both a plea for help to a judge and a form
of notice to responsible governmental officials that a problem ex-
ists. Once a skilled public interest lawyer has marshalled the facts
and the legal aspects of the problem, it's simply wrong to assume
that government officials will wish to stonewall unless overrun by a
judge. Often, government defendants themselves welcome litiga-
tion as an effective means of bringing a problem to the attention of
decision makers with the power to do something about it. I'm sug-
gesting that litigation as a prelude to a negotiated settlement may
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not be unwelcome to bureaucrats who share a common grievance
with the victim group. Each suffers from the inability of the group
to command adequate notice in the political process. Each, it
seems to me, shares a common interest in using litigation, not
merely as a mechanism to invoke the outside intervention of a
judge, but as a means to obtain attention and resources. A par-
ticipatory settlement process serves the interests of both groups.
There are, of course, real limits to whether I, as a public offi-
cial, would consider settlement.
First, and most importantly, I would never consider settlement
unless I determined that the risk to my client from adjudication
was greater than the cost of settlement. In the context of Wilder,
for example, I wouldn't even think about settlement if I didn't fear
that it was possible for you to prevail and that the consequences
for the City's foster-care program if you did prevail would be worse
than the effects of a settlement. Obviously, it's a subjective call,
made after full consultation with my client, but it's precisely what
lawyers are hired to do.
Second, despite your concerns over enforceability, I would not
enter into a rigid settlement that could not be altered in an equita-
ble manner to deal with future changes in circumstances. Not only
would an overly rigid settlement threaten to disrupt orderly gov-
ernment, but it might well do unforeseeable harm to the so-called
beneficiaries of the settlement. Nor would I enter into a settlement
that I believed wrong in principle. As a public official, I don't think
I should allow legitimate interests of expediency like cost, morale,
political reputation, or even potential loss of the case, to stampede
me into a settlement that I believe would be harmful to my client
and the City.
P: That sounds like what I said about constitutional princi-
ple being non-negotiable. You argued that considerations of cost
and uncertainty should lead me to settle even when I felt strongly
that constitutional principle was at stake. Why shouldn't the same
rules hold true for you?
D: Maybe they do. I assume that you wouldn't sign an agree-
ment you felt was harmful to your client's ultimate best interests,
no matter what the cost and uncertainty factors. I merely want to
remind you that the same considerations preclude my entering into
an arrangement that I think is harmful to the polity I represent.
Finally, I don't think I should settle issues that I believe are ulti-
mately reserved for democratic resolution. For example, if the
City's basic charter provided that certain issues must be resolved
by the legislative branch, I would not feel free to enter into a set-
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tlement that short-circuited the democratic process. Of course, I
realize that delicate questions of whether a so-called "constitu-
tional right" trumps a democratic judgment are the essence of ju-
dicial review. I believe, though, that I must exercise self-restraint
in settlement to assure that I do not assume an inappropriate de-
gree of power that should be democratically wielded.
P: Once again, you seem to be articulating a mirror image of
one of my earlier objections to settlement. Isn't your concern for
democratic process very similar to my reluctance to assume the re-
sponsibility of giving away certain aspects of my client's case to
achieve a settlement?
D: The concerns are similar, but your concern can at least be
dealt with partially by a careful Rule 23 hearing. There is no mech-
anism short of adjudication that can release me from my obligation
to respect the democratic process.
P: Aren't you really just saying that you won't settle unless
there is a genuine argument that the law requires a decision by
some means other than resort to the democratic process, or that
the law proscribes certain outcomes, even if they are the product of
the democratic process? Isn't that merely a restatement of the fact
that settlements should roughly approximate the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits? Aren't you really just saying that you'll never
settle a case that lacks a plausible theory on the merits because
what you're really engaged in is a sophisticated form of risk
management?
D: Perhaps so, but whatever its source, a sense of fidelity to
the democratic process imposes real constraints on the ability of a
government lawyer to settle constitutional cases.
Even with my concerns over unduly rigid settlements, poten-
tially harmful settlements, and settlements that fail to respect the
democratic process, I believe that settlements in constitutional
cases can result in a more desirable resolution of a dispute than
resort to dichotomous adjudication. Especially in a case like
Wilder, where trial would exacerbate underlying tensions in the so-
ciety and risk greater alienation between races and religions, I be-
lieve that lawyers have a special obligation to seek to resolve the
dispute, not make it worse. In fact, if you won't negotiate, the City
might well consider unilateral alterations of policy to make a bitter
trial unnecessary.
P: Maybe you're right, but I'm still troubled by a sense that
a strong preference for settlement is a step backwards in seeking to
enforce the legal rights of the weak. In spite of your views on the
desirability of a strong preference for settlement, though, I hope
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you agree that the arguments for and against settlement in public
law settings are sufficiently substantial that the decision whether
or not to settle should be left to the good faith judgments of law-
yers and clients, with the participation of as many interested per-
sons as possible, and should not be subject to pressure-economic
or otherwise. You may persuade me that settlement is a preferable
option in public interest cases, but I hope you agree that neither of
us should be blackmailed, bribed or otherwise coerced into a settle-
ment that we feel is inappropriate.
D: Who's pressuring you?
P: Well, you haven't yet. But I'm waiting for you to play
your Rule 68 card. Under Rule 68, you can place substantial pres-
sure on me to accept a settlement that I believe does not conform
to your participatory justice model. Under the current version of
the Rule, you can present me with an unacceptable settlement, ei-
ther because it fails to reflect a fair sense of the likelihood of ulti-
mate judicial intervention or because it lacks a reasonable likeli-
hood of being enforced. If I reject that settlement offer, I run a
serious economic risk. If I don't do as well as the settlement offer
after trial-in public interest litigation that's always a risk-Rule
68 precludes me from recovering statutory attorneys' fees for work
done after the offer and forces me to absorb your post-offer costs,
even if I prevail on the merits.
In effect, Rule 68 imposes substantial economic pressure on a
public interest lawyer to accept a settlement that he deems less
than fair. I agree that if a settlement offer is rejected in bad faith
or without rational basis, some form of sanction, probably an eco-
nomic one, is called for; but when a lawyer rejects a settlement in
good faith, based on a rational assessment of the case, the lawyer
has done nothing warranting sanction. Only a desire to force the
lawyer to accept a settlement involuntarily can justify the imposi-
tion of an economic penalty on a lawyer who simply guesses wrong
about the likely outcome of the case.
D: I'm not sure it's so terrible to force a public interest law-
yer to bear the economic consequences of his misjudgment about a
case's likely outcome. In the private litigation world, lawyers rou-
tinely pay an economic price for bad judgment. Do you think a
private lawyer would get full time charges for time spent trying a
case when he comes out worse than a rejected settlement offer?
Why shouldn't a public interest lawyer have at least some eco-
nomic incentive to think hard about a proposed settlement?
P: That's my point. He already has such an incentive. Under
existing rules, he must be the "prevailing party" to qualify for
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court-awarded attorneys' fees. A settlement that favorably alters
the status quo on behalf of the plaintiffs qualifies him for fees. If
he rejects such a settlement and loses the adjudication, he is out of
luck in terms of court-awarded fees. Thus an attorney already has
a powerful incentive to accept a reasonable settlement because it
assures him a fee.
All Rule 68 does is to pressure the lawyer by threatening him
with loss of fees if he guesses wrong about the ultimate remedial
outcome of the case.
D: But why should he be paid full value for guessing wrong?
P: Because Congress recognized that public interest litiga-
tion-even your participatory settlement version-can't flourish in
the absence of an economic incentive. Congress, when it passed
Section 1988,15 hoped to induce the bar to act aggressively in en-
forcing public law rights by assuring lawyers that if they won, they
would receive a reasonable fee for services rendered. Unless we
want to skew the settlement process in favor of defendants, the
attempt by a lawyer to obtain what he reasonably believes is a just
remedial outcome is precisely the type of aggressive activity that
Congress wanted to encourage. Rule 68 simply frustrates Congress'
judgment.
D: I wonder whether it's accurate to call a lawyer who turned
down a settlement and then did worse at trial a prevailing party.
From and after the settlement offer, he didn't prevail and, even
without Rule 68, using the Hensley"8 test for fees, I see nothing
terrible in discounting post-offer time in deciding on a reasonable
fee.
P: I think you're looking at the wrong moment in time. If
you snap the shutter after adjudication comes out less favorably
than a rejected settlement, of course the lawyer looks bad. But the
proper point of scrutiny is at the point the lawyer is deciding
whether to accept a Rule 68 offer. If, at that point, he accepts what
he considers to be an inadequate settlement because of pressure
generated by Rule 68, we'll never know whether adjudication
would have resulted in a better deal for the plaintiff. Thus, Rule 68
shouldn't be viewed merely as a penalty for guessing wrong, but as
a strong disincentive to guessing at all.
Even if we disagree about the wisdom of current Rule 68, I
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
,e Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) ("A reduced fee award is appropriate
if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a
whole.").
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hope you agree that the proposal to amend the Rule to permit de-
fendants' attorneys' fees to be shifted to the plaintiff is untenable.
Under the proposed rule, if a plaintiff turns down a settlement and
subsequently fails to prevail, he becomes liable for the post-offer
attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant. When you drop that
blockbuster on your delicate settlement process, you completely
destroy the capacity of the weak group to conduct effective bar-
gaining. Once defendants make a Rule 68 offer, the risk of turning
it down would be much too high for virtually all public interest
clients. In effect, instead of bargaining, you would have settlement
by the unilateral fiat of the defendant.
D: I agree that fee shifting, as opposed to a denial of fees,
may be too blunt an instrument to use to induce settlement. It
would seriously compromise the atmosphere of free bargaining that
I believe critical to the integrity of a participatory settlement. But
I thought the proposed amendment to Rule 68 was withdrawn.
P: It's currently under study.
D: A version of Rule 68 that lets me threaten your client and
you with a ruinous liability if you reject my settlement would cer-
tainly make life easier for me. I certainly wouldn't have to per-
suade you about the wisdom of settlement and my offer wouldn't
have to be as generous. But settlements extracted under such coer-
cive circumstances are subject to all of your general objections and
can't be defended as a truly participatory process. So I guess I
agree with you that Rule 68 should not authorize fee shift-
ing-though fee shifting is certainly appropriate when a settlement
is rejected in bad faith or without rational basis.
Aren't you unduly preoccupied by Rule 68, though? In a case
like Wilder where all that's at stake is injunctive relief, isn't it vir-
tually impossible to say that the injunction you finally get, if you
prevail, is "worse" than the settlement offer? How can the two be
compared?
P: You're right. When injunctive relief is at issue, it's awfully
hard to apply Rule 68, but some courts claim to be able to do so
and lawyers can't be certain about the outcome.
D: You're very quick to argue that plaintiffs shouldn't be
blackmailed into what they believe to be inadequate settlements
through fear of having to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees.
Would you be as quick to concede that defendants should be able
to enter into settlements without risking a ruinous award of fees
against them? In other words, would you be willing to negotiate
the size of your fee at the same time we discuss the merits?
P: I can't. It would place me in a direct conflict of interest
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with my client. The higher my fee, the lower my client's recov-
ery-and vice-versa.
D: You know, of course, that under Jeff D., I can offer you a
settlement conditioned on a waiver of your Section 1988 fees. 17
That creates a powerful economic inducement for defendants to
offer attractive settlements, since settlement may avoid a substan-
tial fee award. Clients will be better off, even if their lawyers are
not.
P: Such an offer places a lawyer in an untenable ethical
position.
D: The Supreme Court doesn't think so. It's really no worse
than the tension existing in a contingent fee setting when a de-
fendant makes an offer that may create a conflict of interest be-
tween a lawyer and client.
P: In a contingent fee setting, there is generally a preexisting
contractual arrangement between consenting adults. The agree-
ment often provides for a means of resolving the potential conflict.
At a minimum, the retainer evinces a conscious recognition and
acceptance of the possibility of conflict. Most public interest litiga-
tion involves plaintiffs who are in no position to bargain over the
terms of representation. When a public interest lawyer is con-
fronted with a settlement that appears to be in the best interests
of his client, he has no choice but to accept it. There is no morally
acceptable mechanism for obtaining consent from a powerless and
often desperate client that would enable a lawyer to turn down a
settlement that helps the client but badly hurts the lawyer. In fact,
a combination of proposed Rule 68 and Jeff D. creates a potential
whipsaw, forcing a lawyer to accept an inadequate settlement in
order to insulate the client from the risk of fee shifting; and to
waive fees as the price of obtaining the inadequate settlement. It
turns your exercise in participatory renegotiation into a charade.
D: I agree that a combination of proposed Rule 68 and Jeff
D. would prove lethal to a serious negotiation process. We aren't at
that stage yet, though, are we? Can a Jeff D. offer that is condi-
tioned on a waiver of fees satisfy Rule 68, since it doesn't cover
accrued costs? I hope you note that I'm not threatening you with
fee shifting or forcing you to waive your fee, precisely because I do
not want to poison the negotiation process.
P: Even if you can't use a Jeff D. offer as a Rule 68 offer, you
can make them one after the other. Thus, you can make a Rule 68
" See Evans v. Jeff. D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1542-43 (1986).
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offer that includes your version of accrued costs. If I refuse it, you
can then make a Jeff D. offer and compel me to discuss the matter
with my client. Or you could reverse the order. Aren't you obliged
by your duty of representation to whipsaw me if you can?
D: I don't think so. Let's put aside for a minute the discus-
sion of adversary process and negotiation. I thought we'd talk
about that problem when we take up your point that negotiations
are futile because our positions are fundamentally irreconcilable. I
want to go back to the Jeff D. point for a minute, though. I agree,
under the conditions of this case, that an offer conditioned on a
waiver of fees seems to fly in the face of the spirit of Section 1988,
although I would feel differently if I thought your legal position
were much weaker. When the strength of a plaintiff's legal position
is not the motivating force in inducing a defendant to settle, I
don't think his lawyer should get fees under Section 1988, so I'd
have no compunction about demanding a waiver. And, I do not
agree that fees shouldn't be discussed as part of an overall settle-
ment. I cannot be in a position to recommend settlement to my
client until I have a good idea of the total exposure. It would be
irresponsible to commit a government defendant to an expensive
settlement that will alter the status quo-altering the status quo
almost always costs a lot of money-without factoring the fee di-
mension of the case into the budgetary calculations.
P: But don't you see, that is exactly the conflict of interest
situation I fear. Once a good settlement is on the table, I can't
bargain much over fees because you know that if you stonewall, I'll
eventually accept whatever you offer.
D: But don't you see, my duty to my client requires me to
make an assessment of the total cost of a settlement and I can't do
that without discussing fees. If you can't bargain when we include
fees in our discussions and I can't bargain unless we do include
fees, one of two things will happen: I'll eventually get tired of wait-
ing and make a Rule 68/Jeff D. offer that will put you under intol-
erable pressure to accept a dictated settlement; or negotiations will
collapse. Isn't there some way to put fees on the table in a way
that won't unfairly pressure you or unfairly prejudice my client?
What if we negotiate the settlement first and then turn to fees only
after we have an acceptable deal on the merits?
P: That's only marginally better. If acceptance of the settle-
ment is conditioned on a subsequent fee agreement, we may have
delayed the conflict, but we haven't avoided it. I'll still be put in a
direct conflict with my client.
D: We may have an impasse here. I don't want it to prevent
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us from exploring a settlement. Suppose we agree to disagree on
the negotiability of fees for the time being. If we can't find a settle-
ment formula for the merits, the fee issue will be academic. If we
do find a constructive way to settle the merits, I can't believe the
settlement would founder over fees.
P: That's just it. I couldn't let it founder over fees, so I'd
have to take whatever you offered.
D: I can only promise you that if we bargain in good faith on
the merits and reach an acceptable settlement, I won't put you in
an untenable position on fees. I'll either rely on the court to set
fees under the Hensley' rule, or try to reach a figure that seems
fair. Unless I have a sense that you're trying to hold me up, I'll
bargain over fees without threatening to withdraw the settlement.
You'll have to trust my sense of fairness. When all is said and
done, I may elect to argue the fee issue before the court, relying on
the fact that, by definition, you were only partially successful and
your time charges should be proportionally reduced. In any event,
let's not allow the fee disagreement to block negotiations.
P: O.K., but I'm very nervous about starting down the path.
If we reach a settlement that I think is desirable, I'm really power-
less to resist you on fees. Many lawyers-perhaps correctly-won't
take that chance.
D: Don't forget, you do have some protection. You can ask
the court to adjust your fee as part of the hearing on the settle-
ment's fairness.
P: Only if you agree to allow the court to do so. If you condi-
tion the settlement on a specific fee arrangement, I'm not certain
that a judge has power to keep the settlement but adjust the fee.
D: Perhaps that's the way out of the impasse. If I promise to
allow a judicial amendment of the fee, we can negotiate on both
fees and merits and at least attempt to reach a package solution. If
we can't, the agreement can go to the judge and you can argue for
an upward modification.
P: That's a little better. But why would you agree to such an
arrangement when you can force me into one that puts more pres-
sure on me?
D: For two reasons, neither terribly altruistic. First, I really
do want to settle Wilder. I think it would be better from every-
one's standpoint-but especially my client's-to get the lawsuit
over with and stabilize a critical system. In addition to stabilizing
,8 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
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the system, I want to limit the risk to the system and to the chil-
dren it serves. If you win-and you may win-the consequences for
my client and for the children involved will be dramatic. If I can
control those consequences through settlement in an acceptable
and fair manner, of course I want to try. I don't want negotiations
to founder on the collateral question of fees. The second reason is
more complex and, perhaps, more controversial. It stems from my
belief that public interest litigation involves ongoing relationships
between plaintiffs and the government. Unlike much litigation,
which involves one-shot collisions between litigants, public interest
litigation generally attempts to structure an ongoing relationship.
Everything I've learned as a lawyer tells me to be wary of pushing
adversarial methods to their limits when setting up an ongoing re-
lationship. Whether it's a corporate merger or a long term employ-
ment contract, I've never viewed such negotiations as a zero-sum
game in which the parties wage total law on one another.
Many lawsuits involve litigants who have no stake in a contin-
uing relationship. Perhaps it's correct to view the settlement of
such a one-shot case as a fight in which one side's gain is another's
loss. And, of course, all litigation at the adjudication phase quite
properly calls forth adversary behavior-although I question
whether a pure adversarial model should govern certain aspects of
litigation, like discovery. But the settlement of public interest liti-
gation should, I think, call forth a different ethic, one that views
the lawyer's role not merely as mechanically adapting the adver-
sary process to negotiation, but as a collective effort to forge a con-
tinuing relationship that preserves the fundamental values under-
lying the opposing positions. I am interested, not merely in ending
a lawsuit, but in settling the underlying dispute in a way that will
enhance the chances for a continuing relationship that, if not har-
monious, at least will prove tolerable. I don't think a blind insis-
tence on pursuing every adversary advantage is calculated to lead
to that end.19 Even if I could bludgeon you into an unfair settle-
ment, it's just not in my client's long-term interests to do so. The
underlying dispute would only break out tomorrow in some other
form. So don't be so surprised that I'm willing to eschew the Rule
68/Jeff D. whipsaw. I'd like to try a different process, one that
stresses the cooperative nature of the enterprise. We should try to
identify the core values underlying the conflicting positions and
'9 For a review of recent writing on whether negotiation should be viewed as an adver-
sarial or as a cooperative process, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of
Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Rsch. J. 905.
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design a structure that respects as many of those core values as
possible. If the values are in irreconcilable conflict, we'll try to de-
sign a structure that minimizes the collision. Once we've designed
such a structure, we'll open it to all interested parties for par-
ticipatory criticism and appropriate modification. If we're success-
ful, we should be able to minimize the collision between establish-
ment and free exercise values, while assuring racial equality and
increased quality of care.
P: You mean a first-come, first-served system that uses pub-
licly-funded religious agencies; that eliminates race and religion as
a factor in gaining access to quality facilities; and that gives effect
to parental wishes whenever possible.
D: There, you've done it. All the rest is filling in the blanks.
As an aid in evaluating the Wilder settlement, we have listed
our personal litigation goals, bearing in mind that a strong diver-
gence of opinion existed on many of these issues among the
lawyers:
ACLU's Goals
1. Assure equal access to quality facilities regard-
less of the race or-religion of the child.
2. Effect a general rise in the quality of available
child care by creating a strong incentive to minimize dif-
ferences in quality among the private agencies.
3. Secularize the system, preferably by dismantling
the sectarian agencies or, if that proved impossible, by
imposing strict limits on the extent to which religion
played a role in placement and treatment.
New York City's Goals
1. Preserve the religiously affiliated agencies be-
cause of their generally high quality, and because the so-
cial dislocation of rebuilding the child care system would
be substantial.
2. Assure that race and religion did not affect equal
access to the highest quality facility available.
3. Protect the free exercise rights of children in
agencies, protecting them from inappropriate religious
pressures.
4. Promote a general rise in quality in the level of
child care.
[1987:
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In retrospect, it was the parties' respective assessments of the
litigation risks that each faced, coupled with a common goal of as-
suring equal access to quality facilities and respect for free exercise
values, that made settlement possible.

